%0 Journal Article
%A FENG Bao
%A JI Chun-yang
%T Evolutionary Game Analysis of Supply Chain Financial Platform Behavioral #br#
Regulation Based on Prospect Theory
%D 2020
%R 10.19722/j.cnki.1008-7729.2020.0010
%J Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications(Social Sciences Edition)
%P 57-67
%V 22
%N 3
%X From the perspective of regulators, the prospect theory is introduced into the supply chain financial platform behavioral regulation, the method of evolutionary game is used to research the game process of the platform and regulators, and constraint conditions and key factors in the absence of platform violation are obtained. MATLAB simulation is used to analyze the influence of various factors on the characteristics of platform behavior evolution. Further, regulatory suggestions are put forward. The results show that: due to the existence of bounded rationality and the influence of the financial environment, it is difficult to achieve all the ideal constraints in reality, and platform violation cannot be eradicated. Reducing the platforms operating costs, regulatory costs and excess profits, improving the platforms perception of regulatory penalties and supply chain financial risks, and strengthening regulators supervision on platform violation can effectively improve the effect of behavioral regulation.
%U https://journalsk.bupt.edu.cn/EN/10.19722/j.cnki.1008-7729.2020.0010